Department of Public and International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran.
Abstract: (33 Views)
Arendt and Levinas consciously distanced themselves from Heidegger’s ontological project and, more broadly, from the tradition of Western metaphysics, shifting the focus of philosophical reflection from Being to the relations among human beings and thereby opening a new horizon of social and intersubjective ontology. This orientation is also reflected in their theories of rights: for Arendt, the possibility of realizing rights is rooted in the concept of “plurality,” whereas for Levinas it is grounded in “alterity” and the ethical relation to the Other. Yet although plurality in Arendt’s thought has significant potential for explaining the conditions of possibility of rights, its formulation remains largely at the ontic level and does not adequately account for its ontological ground. This article argues that Levinas’s ethics of alterity, together with his comparatively neglected reflections on rights, can partially address this theoretical gap. By bringing Levinas’s ontological concept of “alterity” into dialogue with Arendt’s more ontic conception of “plurality,” the article proposes “relationality” as a mediating concept between the ontological and ontic dimensions of rights. On this account, relationality is neither an absolute metaphysical foundation of rights nor a fixed ground, but rather a post-foundational, contingent, and historically situated ground that makes possible the connection between human uniqueness, the presence of the Other, ethical responsibility, and political membership. From this perspective, Arendt’s “right to have rights” and Levinas’s “rights of the Other” can be understood as complementary expressions of a relational structure. The article ultimately argues that the paradox of human rights is not a problem to be resolved by eliminating the underlying tension, but a constitutive tension that legal theory must acknowledge: rights, on the one hand, point toward a ground beyond positive law, while, on the other, they acquire concrete reality only through law, political institutions, and human relations.